Abstract. This paper establishes the basic model of supply chain quality control, and discusses the optimal quality effort level under their respective symmetrical information. The main research subjects are risk-neutral supplier and manufacturer. In this paper, the production process of both sides has a common impact on the quality of finished products, and the manufacturing process of the manufacturer does not affect the intermediate products.
Introduction
Supply chain quality management (SCQM) combines quality management with supply chain management [1] .
Recent years, supply chain quality management has been the focus of supply chain research (He, 2016) [2] .It uses advanced management methods and strict control standards to supervise all aspects of product production, so as to ensure that the quality defects of products are controlled within a reasonable range. Because supply chain is dynamic (Grzybowska et al., 2014) [3] , the implementation of supply chain quality management mainly depends on the guidance of the core enterprises, which not only need to check their own production process, but also need to develop certain measures to guide the quality of production of other member enterprises (Zhang et al., 2018) [4] to ultimately achieve the overall and individual interests.
Model Formulation
This chapter will establish the basic model of supply chain quality control and discuss the optimal quality effort level under their respective symmetrical information. Research finds that the wholesale price is also affected by the quality level of products. The main body of the model is a single supplier and a single manufacturer. Supplier manufactures semi-finished products, and the semi-finished products have a certain defect rate. After testing, the manufacturer puts into follow-up production. At this stage, there are four possible results. In reality, there will be testing errors due to testing methods and other reasons. Therefore, this paper assumes that the manufacturer has the possibility of discarding the truth.
Basic Assumptions
Taking into account the reality, the following basic assumptions will be established in this chapter. Hypothesis 1: the inspection process does not affect the quality of the product; Hypothesis 2: quality cost input includes production, transportation and other links. Hypothesis 3: manufacturers will not find semi-finished products with leak detection during processing.
Hypothesis 4: The quality control and profit of the supply chain are considered not only in the case of unit product but also in the case of product order quantity.
Hypothesis 5: influenced by various factors, it may lead to its abandonment and authenticity. Hypothesis 6: Consumers will find quality defects, but because some quality defects do not affect the use or because of the cost of returns and other factors, only some consumers claim from the manufacturer;
Hypothesis 7: under unit demand. 
Symbolic Meaning.
Where, s a and s b are the corresponding parameters. In order for both parties to have incentives to manufacture, the selling price of the manufacturer to the finished product is greater than or equal to the sum of inspection cost, quality production cost and the wholesale price paid, that is, 
. A denotes the probability that the supplier will bear its own liability, and b denotes the probability that the supplier will bear the quality loss of the manufacturer.
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Model Solution
When one party's real quality level information cannot be observed, there will be unilateral moral hazard. When the two sides cannot observe the other party's real information, there will be bilateral moral hazard.
Suppliers has Unilateral Moral Hazard
When supplier has unilateral moral hazard, the supplier's real quality level information cannot be obtained, and the manufacturer's information is true and public. The basic model is that the supplier bears all internal losses and the manufacturer bears all external losses.
The expected profit function of the supplier and manufacture are: 
Where 
Quality Decision under Bilateral Moral Hazard
Both sides of the quality level information are hidden, suppliers and manufacturers are only from the perspective of personal interests, there is a risk of reducing their quality level.
Formula (11) indicates that the minimum expected return of the supplier is greater than or equal to its retained return, and Formula (12) and Formula (13) mean that both parties take action from the angle of maximizing their own return.
From the formula (12) and (13), the first order optimal solution is obtained respectively for its quality level: The first best solution to the manufacturer's quality level is obtained by formula (11):
Simultaneous (14) and (15) can get: 
Consider 2 m P  the manufacturer's optimal quality level difference under bilateral moral hazard and symmetric information, then: 
When there is bilateral moral hazard, due to the double marginalization, the overall benefit of the supply chain composed of both sides will be lower than the expected profit of the supply chain under symmetrical information, and its benefit will be lost.
Conclusion
This study establishes the basic model of supply chain quality control, explains the inspection process and the probabilities of quality problems, constructs the expected revenue function of supplier and manufacturer under symmetrical information and the overall expected revenue model, and obtains some results by solving the optimal solution under symmetrical information. The conclusion has certain enlightenment to the actual management.
